Protecting the People\u27s Waters: The California Supreme Court Recognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in Water—National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983) by Raymond, Kevin M.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 59 Number 2 
4-1-1984 
Protecting the People's Waters: The California Supreme Court 
Recognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in 
Water—National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 
419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 
(1983) 
Kevin M. Raymond 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Water Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin M. Raymond, Recent Developments, Protecting the People's Waters: The California Supreme Court 
Recognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in Water—National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983), 59 
Wash. L. Rev. 357 (1984). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol59/iss2/7 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
PROTECTING THE PEOPLE'S WATERS: THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES TWO REMEDIES TO SAFE-
GUARD PUBLIC TRUST INTERESTS IN WATER-National Au-
dubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983).
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (the Mono Lake deci-
sion),1 the California Supreme Court declared that interests safeguarded
by the public trust doctrine must be considered and protected whenever
possible in decisions involving the planning and allocation of the state's
water resources. 2 To achieve this, the court incorporated the public trust
doctrine into the appropriative water rights system in California. Ulti-
mately, Mono Lake may prevent the City of Los Angeles from taking
most of the water from streams feeding Mono Lake. 3
The Mono Lake court also expressly recognized both an administrative
1. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983). The
Mono Lake litigation has been examined by several commentators, including Professor Ralph John-
son, who foresaw the clash between the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights sys-
tem, and whose analysis of the conflict figured prominently in the Mono Lake court's resolution of the
problem. See Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D. L.
REV. 233 (1980). See also Dunning, The Significance of California's Public Trust Easementfor Cali-
fornia Water Rights Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 357 (1980); Rossmann, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvL. L.
INST.) 10,109-12 (1983); Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The
Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 63 (1982); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine
and California Water Law: National Audubon Society v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HAST-
INGS L.J. 653 (1982).
2. 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364. The scope of the public trust
doctrine in California following Mono Lake is discussed in Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine
Expansion and Integration: A Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 211, 226-27
(1983).
3. Mono Lake stemmed from litigation over whether the public trust doctrine required recon-
sideration of appropriative water rights in the feeder streams of Mono Lake previously granted to the
City of Los Angeles. 33 Cal. 3d at 424-33, 658 P.2d at 711-18, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348-55. In 1940,
the administrative predecessor to the California Water Resources Control Board (Water Board)
granted a permit to the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles (DWP) that
allowed the DWP to appropriate most of the water from four of five streams flowing into Mono Lake.
Id. at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348. Shortly thereafter, the DWP constructed a diver-
sion tunnel which began taking approximately half the total flow from the four streams. Id.
As a result of the diversions, the level of the lake has dropped dramatically. The surface area of the
lake has been reduced by one-third. The increasing salinity of Mono Lake, caused by the reduction of
fresh water flowing into the lake, threatens an important brine shrimp population there. In addition,
one of the two principal islands in the lake has become a peninsula, exposing a unique and critically
important gull rookery to predators and causing the gulls to abandon it. Id. at 424, 658 P.2d at 711,
189 Cal. Rptr. at 348. The Mono Lake court concluded that "[t]he ultimate effect of continued diver-
sions is a matter of intense dispute, but there seems little doubt that both the scenic beauty and the
ecological values of Mono Lake are imperiled." Id. at 424-25, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
348. See Hoff, The Legal Battle Over Mono Lake, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1982, at 28; Gilbert, Is This a
Holy Place?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED. May 30, 1983, at 76.
357.
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and a judicial remedy to protect public trust interests in water. 4 Both
remedies can, however, be more effective. This Note outlines the public
trust remedies presently in place in California5 by discussing the back-
ground of the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights sys-
tem in California as well as the holdings of the Mono Lake court. This
Note also proposes changes to improve both the administrative and judi-
cial public trust remedies. 6
1. BACKGROUND
A. The Public Trust Doctrine in California
The concept of a public trust began in Roman law and became a part of
the English common law. 7 Historically, the scope of the public trust doc-
trine was limited to tidal water and protected only the public's interests in
navigation, commerce, and fishing. 8 Due primarily to the presence of
large rivers, the public trust doctrine in the United States was extended to
include all navigable waterways. 9 Moreover, the public trust doctrine in
California protects more than such traditional interests as navigation,
hunting, fishing, and general recreational activities. 10 In its current form,
the public trust extends to the preservation of trust resources in their natu-
ral state "as ecological units for scientific study, as open space," and as
habitats for varied forms of life. 11
Upon admission to the union, California acquired title to its navigable
waters as trustee for the public. 12 The state has both the sovereign power
and the duty to exercise continued supervision over trust resources.1 3
4. 33 Cal. 3d at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
5. See infra Parts IIlAI & 111B1.
6. See infra Parts ILIA2 & IIB2.
7. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH L. REV 471, 475-76 (1970); Note, supra note 1, at 656-58. For a general discussion of the
public trust doctrine in the United States, see W. RODGERS. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 170-86 (1977).
8. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 240-44; Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Pre-
rogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.D. L. REV 195. 195-98 (1980).
9. Stevens, supra note 8, at 199-202; Note, supra note 1, at 658-61.
10. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796
(1971). See also Dunning, supra note 1, at 367-68; Stevens, supra note 8, at 221-23; Note, supra
note I, at 664-69.
1I. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259-60,491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. Public trust interests in
water have evolved through time to meet changing public needs and values. Mono Lake. 33 Cal. 3d at
434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
12. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d 362. 365, 162 Cal. Rptr.
327, 330, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). See generally Dunning, supra note 1, at 364-67; Dyer,
California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public Trust, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 571, 573 (1972);
Walston, supra note 1, at 65-66; Note, supra note 1, at 661.
13. 33 Cal. 3d at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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These resources cannot be placed beyond the control of the state. 14 As a
result, parties acquiring rights in trust property generally take subject to
the requirements of the trust and can assert no vested interest to use those
rights in manners harmful to the trust. 15 Although the public trust doctrine
in California does allow the state to choose between competing or con-
flicting trust uses, 16 the choice is assumed to be between "uses and activi-
ties in the vicinity of the lake, stream, or tidal reach at issue." 17
B. The Appropriative Water Rights System in California
In California, a grant of water rights does not convey ownership of the
water; a grantee receives only the right to use the water for useful and
beneficial purposes. 18 An amendment to the Water Commission Act of
191319 made the statute the exclusive procedure for the appropriation of
water. 20 Recent statutory and judicial developments have increased the
power of the California Water Resources Control Board (Water Board)
and have given it the authority to weigh and protect public trust values. 21
14. 33 Cal. 3d at 437-41, 658 P.2d at 721-24, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358-61. The Mono Lake court
relied on Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), as primary authority for the propo-
sition that public trust interests cannot be placed beyond the control of the state. 33 Cal. 3d at
437-38, 658 P.2d at 721-22, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59. For a thorough discussion of Illinois Central,
see Sax, supra note 7, at 489-91.
15. 33 Cal. 3d at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
16. Id. at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
17. Id. (emphasis added). Because the state's power to choose between conflicting trust uses is
customarily limited to the vicinity of the water system at issue, the diversion of water to Los Angeles
for domestic use is probably not a public trust use.
18. Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252-53 (1853). The usufructuary principle of water "owner-
ship" is now codified. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971). For discussions of the usufructuary
principle, see Sax, supra note 7, at 485; Walston, supra note I, at 83-92; Note, supra note 1, at
673-74.
19. 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586. All provisions of the Act are now codified as amended in CAL.
WATER CODE divisions 1, 2.
20. Act of May 2, 1923, ch. 87, § 1, 1923 Cal. Stat. 162 (codified as amended at CAL. WATER
CODE § 1225 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983)).
21. 33 Cal. 3d at 444, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363. Originally, the Water Board
determined only whether water was available to appropriate. Its actions were thus largely ministerial.
Tulare Water Co. v. State Water Comm'n, 187 Cal. 533, 202 P. 874, 876 (1921). A constitutional
amendment in 1928 subjected all uses of water, including the previously exempt riparian uses, to a
reasonable and beneficial standard. CAL. CONsT. art. 10, § 2 (enacted ii 1928 as art. 14, § 3); see also
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486, 498-99 (1935). In 1955, the Water Board
was given the power and duty to weigh the relative costs and benefits of competing beneficial uses of
water in responding to requests for appropriative water rights. Act of June 17, 1955, ch. 1015, § 1,
1955 Cal. Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971)). Four years
later, the legislature declared that the uses of water for recreation and for preservation and enhance-
ment of fish and wildlife resources were beneficial uses of water. Act of July 17, 1959, ch. 2048, § 1,
1959 Cal. Stat. 4742 (codified as amended at CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983)).
And since 1970, the Board is obligated to take into account the quantity of water necessary to protect
359
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1I. THE MONO LAKE DECISION
In Mono Lake,22 the California Supreme Court addressed two issues
critical to the protection of public trust interests in state water allocation
decisions. The first was whether the public trust doctrine was subsumed
within the appropriative water rights system. The second was whether
plaintiffs seeking to enforce the public trust were required to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies before filing suit. 23
The court held that the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water
rights system are parts of an integrated system of law. Within that system,
the public trust doctrine preserves the continuing sovereign power of the
state to protect public trust uses and imposes on the state the duty to con-
sider such uses in allocating water resources. 24 The court required a re-
a source's beneficial uses whenever it determines water availability. Act of July 14, 1969, ch. 482, §
10, 1969 Cal. Stat. 1048 (codified as amended at CAL WATER CODE § 1243.5 (West 1971)).
Today, appropriative decisions by the Water Board are quasi-judicial rather than ministerial.
Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d 90, 280 P.2d 1, 7 (1955). From the
state's comprehensive regulatory scheme, the courts have found a broad legislative intent to "vest in
the board expansive powers to safeguard the scarce water resources of the state." People v. Shiro-
kow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 309, 605 P.2d 859, 865, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 35 (1980).
22. The Mono Lake litigation has been procedurally complex. Plaintiffs originally filed suit in
the Superior Court for Mono County on May 21, 1979. Venue and a tentative trial date were set in
Alpine County, California. In early 1980, the DWP cross-claimed against numerous parties, includ-
ing the United States, which promptly removed the case to the federal District Court for the Eastern
District of California. The federal court stayed its proceedings under a branch of the federal absten-
tion doctrine, which allows a federal court to temporarily extricate itself when presented with difficult
questions of state law relating to issues of transcendent public importance. 33 Cal. 3d at 431-32 n. 12,
658 P.2d at 717 n. 12, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54 n. 12.
Based on the issues of state law ultimately resolved by the Mono Lake court, plaintiffs then filed a
new complaint in California superior court. The DWP's argument that the new complaint amounted
to a constitutionally impermissible request for an advisory opinion was rejected by the Mono Lake
court both because such a characterization would have amounted to a refusal to cooperate with the
federal courts and because the issue was clearly justiciable. On November 9, 1981, the superior court
entered summary judgment against the plaintiffs, dismissing their public trust doctrine arguments on
the grounds that, first, the doctrine was subsumed within the existing statutory water rights system in
California and, second, that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Plaintiffs then filed a petition of mandate with the California Supreme Court to review the superior
court entry of summary judgment against them. The supreme court issued an alternative writ and
accepted the Mono Lake case. On February 17, 1983, the court resolved both issues in favor of the
plaintiffs and issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the superior court to vacate its in-
tended judgment. Currently, the California courts are attempting to resolve the Mono Lake contro-
versy in light of the holdings of the Mono Lake court.
23. 33 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 658 P.2d at 717, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
24. Id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369. At the time the administrative predecessor
to the Water Board granted the permit to the City of Los Angeles to appropriate water from streams
feeding Mono Lake, the agency did not-and could not-consider the public trust effects of the
grant. Id. at 427-28, 658 P.2d at 713-14, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51.
Mono Lake may figure prominently in a national emergence of the public trust doctrine in the water
rights area. For example, the decision was relied on as an integral part of the Idaho Supreme Court's
360
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consideration of the diversion of water from streams feeding Mono Lake
in light of the public trust.25 As a result of Mono Lake, the public trust
doctrine now protects navigable waters such as Mono Lake from harm
caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributary streams. 26 The court noted,
however, that appropriative rights would not be invalidated simply be-
cause they harmed public trust interests. 27 Rather, it held that the state has
"an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning
and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses when-
ever feasible." 28
The court also held that parties raising public trust claims involving
water resources need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing
suit in superior court because the courts share concurrent original jurisdic-
tion with the Water Board.29 For the first time, the California Supreme
Court recognized that both an administrative and a judicial remedy exist
for raising public trust claims involving water resources. In construing
section 2501 of the California Water Code30 to allow claimants to raise
public trust issues in determinations of water rights before the Water
Board, the court recognized an administrative public trust remedy. 31 In
holding that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing their public trust claims in superior court, the Mono
Lake court similarly recognized a concurrent judicial remedy to enforce
the public trust doctrine in water resource decisions. 32
recent enunciation of the scope of that state's public trust doctrine in water. See Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1093-94 (Idaho 1983).
25. 33 Cal. 3d at 452-53, 658 P.2d at 732-33, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
26. Id. at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357. Mono Lake is the first California case
expressly extending public trust protection to nonnavigable waters based on the effects that diversions
have on historically protected navigable waters such as Mono Lake. In extending public trust protec-
tion to nonnavigable waters, the court adopted the reasoning of Professor Johnson, who has stated:
"If the public trust doctrine applies to constrainfills which destroy navigation and other public trust
uses in navigable waters, it should equally apply to constrain the extraction of water that destroys
navigation and other public interests. Both actions result in the same damage to the public interest."
Johnson, supra note 1, at 257-58 (footnotes omitted).
27. 33 Cal. 3d at 445-46, 658 P.2d at 727-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364. The court went on to state
that
[n]ow that the economy and population centers of this state have developed in reliance upon
appropriated water, it would be disingenuous to hold that such appropriations are and have al-
ways been improper to the extent that they harm public trust uses, and can be justified only upon
theories of reliance or estoppel.
Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
30. CAL. WATER CODE § 2501 (West 1971), quoted infra note 34.
31. 33 Cal. 3d. at 449, 658 P.2d at 730, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67.
32. Id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
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III. THE PUBLIC TRUST MODEL FOR WATER RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA: EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
REMEDIES AND PROPOSED CHANGES FOR EACH MODEL
Mono Lake affirmed that evolving public needs and values require the
protection of a wide variety of public trust interests in water. 33 If judicial
and administrative remedies are inadequate, however, important public
uses and resources may be irrevocably lost and the underlying purpose of
Mono Lake frustrated. Thus, the efficacy of Mono Lake requires a critical
examination of the adequacy of both remedies.
A. The Administrative Remedy
1. Existing Administrative Remedy
Following Mono Lake, parties seeking to enforce the public trust in the
use of water will have an express administrative remedy under section
2501 of the California Water Code. 34 The Water Board can now be re-
quired to consider the interests protected by the public trust doctrine in all
of its decisions, including those made in the past. 35
The Water Board will not, however, make a determination of water
rights under section 2501 until a "claimant" has filed a formal petition,
and the Board finds that "the public interest and necessity" will thereby
be served. 36 Once a claimant has successfully petitioned for a determina-
tion of all rights to water in a given water system, 37 the Board initiates an
33. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. CAL. WATER CODE § 2501 (West 1971) provides:
"'The board may determine, in the proceedings provided for in this chapter, all rights to water of a
stream system whether based upon appropriation, riparian right, or other basis of right." Public trust
claims may be raised under § 2501 even though they were apparently not contemplated by the drafters
of the statute. The Mono Lake court noted that it was unclear whether a public trust claim was techni-
cally a claim of a "water right" or whether a person asserting such a claim was a "claimant" entitled
to an administrative determination by the Water Board. 33 Cal. 3d at 448, 658 P.2d at 729, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 366. Nonetheless, the Mono Lake court held that the public trust plaintiffs could seek an
administrative determination, reasoning that because § 2501 gave the Board substantive powers to
carry out a legislative mandate to give comprehensive protection to state water resources, it should
have the power to hear such claims. Id. at 449, 658 P.2d at 730, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
35. 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
36. CAL WATER CODE § 2525 (West 1971) provides:
Upon petition signed by one or more claimants to water of any stream system, requesting the
determination of the rights of the various claimants to the water of that stream system, the board
shall, if, upon investigation, it finds the facts and conditions are such that the public interest and
necessity will be served by a determination of the water rights involved, enter an order granting
the petition and make proper arrangements to proceed with the determination.
37. Although the statutory adjudication procedure to determine water rights is expressly applica-
ble to "stream systems," the term is nearly exhaustive, excluding only certain underground waters.
Id. § 2500.
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adjudicatory proceeding designed to resolve all related issues.38 Follow-
ing the Board's determination, its order and the administrative record are
filed in superior court. 39 Any party may challenge the order by requesting
a hearing. After the hearing, or if no party requests a hearing, the court
enters a final decree.40
2. Proposed Changes for the Public Trust Administrative Remedy
The administrative public trust remedy should ensure (1) that public
trust interests are adequately recognized and protected by the Water
Board in all water allocation decisions and (2) that harm to trust values is
permitted only when in the public interest and no feasible alternative ex-
ists. Under the existing administrative remedy, public trust interests may
not always be considered because the Board need not act unless there is
both a claimant and a Board finding of public interest and necessity.
Thus, the public trust in water resources may not be adequately protected
in actions before the Board. In addition, the burden of showing a viola-
tion of the public trust is on the public trust "claimant," rather than on
the party whose action may harm such interests.41
38. Id. §§ 2500-2900 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983). Procedural safeguards for administrative adju-
dications include the right to introduce evidence and to call and cross-examine witnesses. See CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, 88 950-69 (1977). Notice of the determination proceedings is required. CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 2526-27 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983). Claimants are required to notify the Water
Board that they intend to file a claim; they must then appear and offer proof to substantiate their
claim. Id. § 2528 (West 1971). See also id. §§ 2600-59 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983).
In addition to a consideration of diversions and the beneficial uses being made of water from the
system, the Board is required to "gather such other data and information as may be essential to the
proper determination of the water rights in the stream system." Id. § 2550 (West Supp. 1983). Fol-
lowing Mono Lake, this requirement should include a consideration of public trust values. In short,
an examination of the effects which a particular mix of water uses in a water system would have on
public trust interests ought to be treated as "other data and information as may be essential to the
proper determination of the water rights in the stream system." After a period in which claimants
may contest proofs made by other claimants, the Board is required to enter an order in its office
establishing those rights to water. Id. § 2700. Final determinations are preceded by a preliminary
order of determination. Id. § 2603. Following entry of a final determination under § 2700, the Board
may grant a rehearing for "good cause shown." Id. § 2702.
39. CAL. WATER CODE § 2750 (West 1971). The court sets a date for a judicial hearing on the
administrative order of determination. Id. Any party of interest may file exceptions to the order of
determination. Id. § 2757. If no party in interest takes formal exception to the Water Board's determi-
nation before the hearing date, no hearing is held and the Board's determination becomes final. Id. §
2762. Hearing procedure is to be "as nearly as may be in accordance with the rules governing civil
actions." Id. § 2764. The court may require that the state be made a party, it may make additional
investigations, and it may refer issues back to the Board. Id. 38 2765-67.
40. Id. § 2768. The final decree must specifically state the rights of each claimant. Id. § 2769.
There is a right of appeal. Id. § 2771.
41. The Mono Lake court held that parties asserting the public trust might be considered to be
"claimants" within the statutory definition. See supra note 34. Such an interpretation would place
363
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Several changes would strengthen the administrative public trust rem-
edy. First, the public trust should be automatically considered in every
water rights determination or allocation decision by the Water Board,
whether or not there is a public trust "claimant." Second, public trust
claims before the Board should as a general rule be held to meet the
"public interest and necessity" requirement. Third, the Board should be
required to consider express elements of the public trust and should be
further required to make findings of fact with respect to each element.
Fourth, determinations made by the Board should be subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny. Finally, each determination of water rights which the Board
finds will have an effect on public trust values should be accompanied by
an express statement (a) that the Board intends to alienate public trust
rights, (b) that such alienation is in the public interest, and (c) that no
feasible alternative to the action exists.
a. Public Trust Claimant Not Required
Despite the fact that the Mono Lake court liberally construed section
2501 of the California Water Code to grant an administrative public trust
remedy to parties asserting public trust claims in water uses, 42 no provi-
sion obligates the Water Board to consider public trust interests in the
absence of a public trust "claimant." Consideration of such interests
should not depend solely on an alert citizenry. Moreover, the burden of
consideration and protection of public trust interests has been placed upon
the state which, in water allocation decisions, acts through the Board.43
Therefore, the legislature or the courts should require the Board to con-
sider the effects of each of its water rights decisions on the public trust,
whether or not there is a public trust "claimant. "44
the administrative burden of proof on the party claiming public trust violations before the Water
Board.
42. As noted supra note 39 and accompanying text, under normal circumstances the procedural
provisions for a determination of water rights by the Water Board are not initiated in the absence of a
petition by a claimant. The court noted that although a party raising public trust issues in a petition for
determination of water rights might not be a "claimant" within the contemplation of the statute, such
a party nonetheless has a remedy under CAL. WATER CODE § 2501 (West 1971). Thus, in most cases
brought before the Board, public trust "claimants" may require the Board to consider the effects
which its allocation decisions have had, or will have, on interests protected by the public trust.
43. See supra notes 2 & 24 and accompanying text.
44. It might be argued that requiring the Water Board to consider effects on the public trust even
absent a public trust claimant offends the United States Supreme Court's holding in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont
Yankee, however, can be distinguished. In that case, the Court held that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission need meet only the minimum statutory requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) and was, therefore, under no obligation to consider environmental effects not raised by
the parties. Under the administrative public trust remedy, however, the Board-apart from the fact
364
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b. Public Trust Interests Are Synonomous With Public Interest and
Necessity
The Water Board is under no statutory obligation to make a determina-
tion of water rights unless it first finds that such a determination would be
in the "public interest and necessity.' "45 If the Board follows an overly
narrow interpretation of "public interest and necessity," it might refuse
to consider legitimate public trust claims. 46 Such a result would clearly
frustrate the spirit of Mono Lake. By granting the administrative remedy,
despite the doctrinal difficulties in doing so,47 the California Supreme
Court has already indicated that in most instances such claims serve the
public interest and are necessary. The legislature or the courts should
clarify this implicit conclusion to avoid confusion over the Water Board's
duty to consider good faith public trust claims raised under section 2501.
c. Mandatory Public Trust Interests and Findings of Fact
(1) Mandatory Consideration of Public Trust Factors
Although some elements of the public trust must already be considered
by the Water Board,48 many other elements remain part of an amorphous
judicial doctrine. As a result, the scope of the Board's new public trust
responsibilities may be uncertain, and the Board may fail to consider im-
portant elements of the public trust doctrine in actions involving water
resources.
In order to ensure that the Water Board gives the public trust adequate
consideration in its decisions, the Board's responsibilities need to be
clarified. As part of the duty to consider the public trust in all water re-
that it does not operate under the APA-has an affirmative duty to consider environmental effects on
public trust interests, even if they are not raised initially by parties. See supra note 43 and accompa-
nying text. See also Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close
Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699, 718-24 (1979).
45. CAL. WATER CODE § 2525 (West 1971). See supra note 39.
46. Mono Lake should not be read to require an extended consideration of public trust claims that
lack probable merit. However, a rebuttable presumption that public trust claims raised under CAL.
WATER CODE § 2501 (West 1971) are brought in the "public interest and necessity" should be cre-
ated. If the Water Board concludes that a public trust claim is frivolous, it could then decline to order
that a determination be made. The Board, however, should be required to expressly find that a public
trust claim lacks merit and is therefore frivolous. Such a finding could not be reviewed because only
"determinations" by the Board can be appealed. See id. §§ 2768, 2771. However, an appeal could
effectively be had by resort to the judicial remedy. See infra Part IIIB.
47. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 21. The requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB.
REs. CODE §§ 21,000-176 (West 1977) impose similar obligations. See Robie, Some Reflections on
Environmental Considerations in Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 701-10
(1972).
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source allocation decisions, the courts or the legislature should require the
Board to consider a comprehensive list of public trust interests. 49 The list
should include each interest protected by the public trust doctrine in Cali-
fornia.
While the judicially fashioned public trust doctrine would retain its vi-
tality, 50 codification of the most important elements of the public trust in
the water resources context would help to ensure that the Board fully con-
siders the doctrine. 51 Because the Board is charged with upholding all
interests protected by the public trust, the list of interests should include
the preservation of trust resources in their natural state for environmental
reasons as well as the historic public trust uses such as navigation, com-
merce, and fishing. 52 Finally, the list of public trust interests should not
49. Otherwise, the Water Board would be required to consider the entire range of judicial deci-
sions involving the requirements imposed by the public trust doctrine.
50. The Mono Lake court stated in a related context: "Aside from the possibility that statutory
protections can be repealed, the noncodified public trust doctrine remains important both to confirm
the state's sovereign supervision and to require consideration of public trust uses in cases filed di-
rectly in the courts without prior proceedings before the board." 33 Cal. 3d at 446 n.27, 658 P.2d at
728 n.27, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364 n.27.
51. Other jurisdictions have required that various public-trust-type interests be considered by
administrative agencies charged with responsibility over them. E.g., Mystic Marinelife Aquarium,
Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 400 A.2d 726, 734 (1978) (agency must protect waters with regard to
prevention of erosion, the uses and development of adjoining lands, improvements for navigation,
and other state interests, including pollution control and recreational uses); Indiana Envtl. Manage-
ment Bd. v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp., 393 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (in approving
regulations and making standards, agency must consider past, present, and future uses, air and water
quality, technical feasibility and economic reasonableness, in taking into account the right of all
persons to have a safe environment); Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich.
159. 220 N.W.2d 416, 428 (1974) (agency must find no feasible and prudent alternative to project
and that project is in public interest given state's paramount concern for the protection of natural
resources); Michigan Oil Co. v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 71 Mich. App. 667, 249 N.W.2d 135.
143 (1976), aff d, 406 Mich. 1,276 N.W.2d 141, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979) (use of trust
resources cannot involve waste); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation
Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 462-63 (N.D. 1976) (public trust requires planning by state agencies in
allocating public water resources, including determination of potential effect of water allocations on
present supplies and future water needs of the state): Community College v. Fox, 20 Pa. Commw.
335. 342 A.2d 468, 476 (1975) (agency must consider direct and indirect effects of, and alternatives
to, projects affecting natural, scenic, historic, and aesthetic values of the environment). In a 1981
advisory opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed a proposed statute that
would require careful consideration of the public trust doctrine before allowing development in tide-
land areas. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1393, 424 N.E.2d 1111. The
statute would require consideration of public trust values such as navigation, commerce that benefits
the public, recreational uses, and the state's interest in the conservation of the natural environment.
424 N.E.2d at 1116 n.5. Under the statute, public interest development permits would be granted
only upon written findings supported by substantial evidence that development will not (a) diminish
public control of the resource or (b) lessen public rights of use and access to them. Id. at 1117 n.6.
52. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971)
(discussing the public trust in tidelands).
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be considered exhaustive and should be modified to meet changing public
trust needs as they develop. 53
(2) Required Findings of Fact
The Water Board should be required to make findings of fact with re-
spect to each public trust interest considered under this proposal. 54 Strong
policy reasons support the requirement that administrative agencies jus-
tify their conclusions with written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In addition to facilitating judicial review, 55 a findings requirement has
been found to (1) help avoid judicial usurpation of the administrative
function, (2) ensure more careful consideration of facts and issues, (3) aid
parties in the preparation of their cases for rehearings and judicial review,
and (4) ensure that agencies operate within their jurisdiction.56
These traditional reasons for requiring that an agency submit findings
of fact apply with great force in the public trust context. In addition to
providing a clearer record for review of the Water Board's determina-
tions, a public trust findings requirement would make it more likely that
each public trust interest is actually considered by the Board. It would
also assist claimants in preparing their appeals or petitions for rehearing
in the event they consider the public trust issue improperly resolved. Fi-
nally, the findings requirement would tend to encourage more fully rea-
soned determinations by the Board.57
A findings requirement may delay decisionmaking and thereby slow or
even prohibit the development of water resources. However, the impor-
tance and frailty of the public trust interests outweigh the costs of possible
delay which might be occasioned by the findings requirement. Many pub-
lic trust uses, such as the preservation of water systems in their natural
state, would be irrevocably lost if development of the water resource is
allowed improperly or prematurely. 58 Delaying such development until a
53. As the Marks court stated: "In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an out-
moded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another." Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380,
98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
54. This requirement is in addition to the express intent to alienate required. See infra notes
62-65 and accompanying text.
55. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the orderly functioning of the process of
review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and
adequately sustained." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
56. 2K. DAvis. ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 16.05(1958).
57. As Judge Frank observed, "[o]ften a strong impression that, on the basis of the evidence, the
facts are thus-and-so gives way when it comes to expressing that impression on paper." Id.
58. The possibility that public trust interests might be irrevocably lost through premature or
improper development is well illustrated by the effects which the diversions have had on the ecology
of Mono Lake. See supra note 3.
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final, supportable determination has been made is consistent with the re-
sponsibility given the state by Mono Lake.
d. Strict Scrutiny Review of Water Board Determinations
Statutory judicial review of Water Board determinations by the supe-
rior court is not a proceeding by certiorari or appeal, but rather is an origi-
nal action. 59 A court, therefore, can exercise its own judgment as to the
proper determination of rights to water in a given water system. Conse-
quently, the deferential standard of review of administrative decisions
generally used by the courts6° should not be employed in statutory adjudi-
cations involving public trust claims.
Water Board determinations which impair public use or enjoyment of a
public trust resource necessarily alienate part of that public trust resource.
Such determinations involve an alienation of the public trust analogous to
alienations which have been effected by legislative act and which have
been subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 61 It follows that administrative de-
terminations which impair the public trust should be similarly subject to
strict scrutiny under the reasoning of cases involving legislative alien-
ation.62
e. Intent to Alienate Clearly Expressed
The state's intent to alienate public trust uses "must be clearly ex-
pressed or necessarily implied." 63 Mono Lake obligates the Water Board
to consider the public trust in the allocation of the state's water resources,
59. Mojave River Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 717, 262 P. 724,726-27 (1927).
60. Ordinarily, judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to determining whether the
agency failed to comply with required procedural safeguards, or whether its decision is arbitrary,
capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d
694, 719, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825, 846 (1973).
61. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913); see also City of Berkeley
v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 528, 606 P.2d 362, 369, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 334, cert. denied.
449 U.S. 840 (1980).
62. The reasoning in California Fish and City of Berkeley, while referring specifically to the
scrutiny afforded statutes purporting to alienate trust resources, should be equally applicable in re-
viewing determinations made by the Water Board. For a good statement of the reasoning behind this
conclusion, see Note, supra note 1, at 682. The conclusion in those cases that the state has the
inherent power to alienate public trust resources was reaffirmed in Mono Lake. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text. However, because of the state's paramount duty to protect public trust values
whenever possible, the intent to alienate by statute has nevertheless been subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.
63. California Fish, 138 P. at 88. Again, while the requirements of California Fish apply to
legislative attempts to alienate public trust interests, similar requirements should be placed upon ac-
tions of the Water Board which in effect alienate similar trust interests.
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and requires that the public trust be protected whenever feasible. 64 The
Board may allocate water only when in the public interest. 65 Each time its
actions have an effect on interests protected by the public trust, the Board
should be required to expressly state (a) that it intends to alienate public
trust interests, (b) that such action is in the public interest, and (c) that no
feasible alternative to the action exists. 66 By requiring the Board to make
a statement of intent to alienate public trust interests, parties before the
Board can be assured that the public trust requirements imposed by Cali-
fornia law have at least been considered. 67
B. The Judicial Remedy
1. Existing Judicial Remedy
In addition to recognizing an administrative remedy, the Mono Lake
court held that parties can bring an original action in the courts to enforce
the trust. 68 After examining prior judicial decisions dealing with the juris-
dictional relationship between the Water Board and the California courts
in matters relating to the proper use of state waters, 69 the court concluded
that remedies before the Board are not exclusive and the courts have con-
current jurisdiction.70 The court acknowledged that original actions in the
64. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
65. CAL. WATE CODE §§ 105, 1253, 1256 & 1257 (West 1971).
66. This test incorporates both the obligation of the state to consider the public interest in all uses
of water, see infra note 86 and accompanying text, and the requirements imposed on it by Mono
Lake. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
67. This is in addition to the findings requirement because, while it will impose only negligible
additional burdens on the Water Board, it will comport more fully with case law requiring that the
intent to alienate public trust interests be expressly stated or necessarily implied. See supra notes
60-62 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
69. 33 Cal. 3d at 449-51, 658 P.2d at 730-32, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366-68. The Mono Lake court
noted that in resolving the tension between agency expertise and an established line of cases which
had assumed concurrent jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court previously had expressly recog-
nized the existence of concurrent jurisdiction between the courts and the Water Board to enforce the
self-executing provisions of art. 10, § 2 of the California Constitution. Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. (EDF II), 26 Cal. 3d 183, 200, 605 P.2d 1, 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466,
475 (1980). Because the intervenors in EDF II had based their claims on unreasonable use of water
under the constitutional provision, the court did not require them to exhaust their administrative
remedies. Id.
70. 33 Cal. 3d at 451, 658 P.2d at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368. Although Justice Richardson
dissented on this issue, see id. at 453-55, 658 P.2d at 733-35, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71, the court
pointed out that several statutory provisions in the California Water Code indicated the legislature had
not intended to vest exclusive primary jurisdiction in the Water Board to decide water rights. Specifi-
cally, the court noted that the statutory power given courts to determine rights to water, to refer
issues, and to remand for factual investigations necessarily implied that the courts were intended to
share jurisdiction with the Board. Id. at 451, 658 P.2d at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368. The Mono Lake
court held that the courts could adjudicate all rights to the use of water, including rights under the
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courts to determine water rights might interfere with the obligations of the
Board. 71 The court concluded, however, that because a court involved in
determining water rights could refer complex issues to the Board, such
dangers could be substantially eliminated. 72
2. Proposed Changes for the Public Trust Judicial Remedy
The judicial remedy is a vital part of the comprehensive public trust
scheme envisioned by the Mono Lake court. 73 The importance of the judi-
cial remedy will not be diminished even if the administrative remedy is
strengthened through the adoption of the recommendations discussed
above. 74 Mono Lake thrusts important public trust responsibilities upon
the Water Board, which has never before considered the public trust in its
water allocation decisions. The Board may be hesitant or unable to fully
implement the judicial doctrine of the public trust in the near future. By
granting a judicial remedy, the Mono Lake court has recognized that judi-
cial involvement in the water resources area is necessary to protect public
trust interests. 75
The judicial remedy recognized in Mono Lake can ensure careful con-
sideration of the public trust interests in the allocation of water resources.
In its present form, however, the judicial remedy may not effectively pro-
tect public interests in water. First, the courts may find themselves handi-
capped by their lack of knowledge in the water resource field. Second,
public trust interests may be jeopardized as a result of uncertainty as to
allocation of the burden of proof in public trust cases.
public trust, whether or not such claims fell within the reasonable and beneficial purview of art. 10, §
2 of the California Constitution. Id.
7 I. Id. at 450-51,658 P.2d at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
72. Id. at 451, 658 P.2d at 731-32, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
73. California courts have broad power to grant immediate equitable relief, such as injunctions,
when appropriate to protect the immediate rights and property interests of other parties. CAL Ctv
PRoC CODE §§ 525-35 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983). The interests sought to be protected by the public
trust doctrine are particularly vulnerable to destruction or impairment, and are therefore especially
well suited to protection by the courts pending the resolution of public trust issues raised or necessar-
ily considered in each action.
While it may legitimately be argued that granting equitable relief may harm the interests of those
asserting the right to the use of water when such fight is subsequently affirmed, the fragile, unique.
and often irreplaceable nature of the public trust interests in water makes it clear that the state should
err on the side of caution when dealing with its public trust water resources. Further, the granting of
such equitable relief is consistent with the recommendation, see infra notes 86-89 and accompanying
text, that the ultimate burden of proof should be upon the party whose actions may affect the public
trust.
74. See supra Part IIIA2.
75. If the Water Board subsequently demonstrates it is consistently meeting its public trust re-
sponsibilities, judicial involvement in the area, under the judicial remedy, can gradually be eased.
Until that time, case-by-case decisions under the judicial remedy will help to define the Board's
duties in the area.
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Two proposed changes would help to ensure that the public trust judi-
cial remedy announced in Mono Lake adequately protects public trust in-
terests in water. First, when the public trust judicial remedy is invoked,
the courts should in most instances retain jurisdiction and refer the case to
the Water Board for an initial resolution of the issues. Second, following
an initial prima facie showing of actual or probable harm to public trust
interests, the burden of proof should shift to the party whose actions al-
legedly threaten the interests protected by the trust.
a. Initial Determination of Issues by Water Board
While the courts have dealt extensively with the public trust doctrine,
they may lack the requisite expertise in complex cases to competently
apply the doctrine in the water rights context. The courts, however, have
broad statutory authority to seek administrative assistance, 76 including
the power to refer issues to the Water Board.77 After the court has framed
the issues, the acknowledged expertise of the Board in the water area
should be regularly employed. 78
The policy reasons behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction79 sup-
port regular use of broad reference powers by the courts in water cases
involving public trust claims. While longstanding judicial precedent in
California has denied the Water Board exclusive primary jurisdiction in
water rights cases,80 policy reasons behind the doctrine-the recognition
of administrative expertise and the need for orderly and sensible coordi-
nation of the work of the courts8 1-are equally applicable to water rights
determinations. The courts should, therefore, make liberal use of the
Board's expertise in the resolution of public trust issues raised in the
courts.
Similarly, the policy supporting the well-established doctrine of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies favors use of the courts' reference
powers. 82 As a general rule, most jurisdictions have required exhaustion
76. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000, 2001 & 2075 (West 1971).
77. Id. § 2000.
78. 33 Cal. 3d at 451, 658 P.2d at 731-32, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368. Elsewhere, the court discussed
the complexity of the issues presented in water use actions. Id. at 451 n.32, 658 P.2d at 731 n.32,
189 Cal. Rptr. at 368 n.32.
79. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not govern judicial review of administrative actions
but simply determines which body should make the initial resolution of the issues. 3 K. DAvis, supra
note 56, § 19.01.
80. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
81. See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 (1963); Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573-75 (1952); Woodard v. Broadway Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111
Cal. App. 2d 218,244 P.2d 467, 469 (1952).
82. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969).
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of remedies before allowing relief in the courts "when the question pre-
sented is one within the agency's specialization and when the administra-
tive remedy is as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted re-
lief. "83 The Water Board's expertise with complex issues presented in
the water context 84 should not be overlooked. Courts addressing public
trust claims involving the use of water should refer such issues to the
Board before making their ultimate resolution of the issues. To facilitate
well-reasoned judicial review, the Board's initial resolution of the issues
referred to it should be supported by findings of fact. 85
b. Burden of Proof on Public Trust Impairer
Mono Lake did not establish which party will have the burden of proof
in water rights litigation involving public trust claims. The party bringing
an action in the courts to enforce the public trust should be required to
make an initial prima facie showing that public trust interests have been,
or probably will be, harmed. Following such an initial showing, the bur-
den of proof should shift to the party whose actions are challenged. 86 This
83. 3 K. DAVIS. supra note 56, § 20.01.
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. The courts have the power to require the Water Board to make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law with respect to issues presented it. CAL. WATER CODE § 2012 (West 1971).
86. While the burden of proof in some jurisdictions has been placed upon the party seeking to
show impairment of important public resources, other jurisdictions have placed the burden on the
party whose activities impinge on public trust resources. Compare, e.g., In re Solid Waste Disposal
Permit Application, 268 N.W.2d 599, 602-03 (S.D. 1978) (opponent of waste disposal permit failed
to show feasible alternative existed) with Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 184 Conn. 51,
441 A.2d 68, 74-75 (1981) (after prima facie showing of likely impairment of public trust interests,
burden of production shifts and the impairer must rebut prima facie showing); Ray v. Mason County
Drain Comm'r, 393 Mich. 294, 224 N.W.2d 883, 889 (1975) (burden on public trust impairer after
initial showing of likelihood of harm); Marcon, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 462 A.2d
969, 971 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (burden on impairer after initial showing of likelihood of environ-
mental harm); and Big Fork Mining Co. v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd., 620 S.W.2d 515,
520 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (burden on party seeking privileges which threaten public's interest in
natural resources).
The Michigan public trust statute, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
When the plaintiff in the action has made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the defen-
dant has, or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the
public trust therein, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of evi-
dence to the contrary. The defendant may also show, by way of an affirmative defense, that
there is no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct and that such conduct is con-
sistent with the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of the state's para-
mount concern for the protection of its natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion. Except as to the affirmative defense, the principles of burden of proof and weight of the
evidence generally applicable in civil actions in the circuit courts shall apply to actions brought
under this act.
MIct COMP LAWS § 691.1203(1) (1970) (MICH STAT ANN. § 14.528(203)(1) (Callaghan 1980)).
This Note suggests that adoption of the Michigan public-trust-burdens model in California would not
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party should be required to show either (a) that its actions will have no
adverse effects on the public trust or (b) that the action is in the public
interest8 7 and there is no feasible alternative. 88
Following Mono Lake, the public trust in water resources and uses
must yield when the public interest requires it and where no feasible alter-
native exists. Nevertheless, alienation of public trust rights in water
should be the exception rather than the rule. 89 Thus, because the state
carries an affirmative obligation to protect the public trust in water, 90 the
burden should be on the party seeking to benefit at the expense of the
public and its trust resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mono Lake mandates consideration of the public trust in all water
rights decisions. To ensure that the public trust is taken into account when
required, the Mono Lake court recognized both an adminstrative and a
judicial remedy. Important public trust interests in water resources, how-
ever, may not be adequately protected unless the remedies designed to
protect them are strong. Changes to the administrative and judicial
remedies recommended in this Note would help to ensure that the man-
dates of Mono Lake are in fact realized.
Kevin M. Raymond
only be consonant with Mono Lake, but would also serve to better protect important public trust
interests there.
87. By constitutional amendment, all water in California must be put to "reasonable and benefi-
cial use... in the interest of the people and for the public welfare." CAL. CONsT. art. 10, § 2. See
also supra note 21.
88. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. This is the Mono Lake test for determining
whether the alienation of public trust interests is permissible.
89. 33 Cal. 3d at 441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
90. See supra notes 24 & 28 and accompanying text.
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